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1 Introduction
This paper examines technology policy in an economy with innovation and
imitation. Through the development of new products, an innovator achieves
a temporary advantage earning monopoly profits. This advantage ends when
an imitator succeeds in copying the innovation, enters the market and starts
competing with the innovator. In this paper, we assume that (a) firms cannot
borrow without collateral, and (b) they cannot use their immaterial property
(e.g. innovations or imitations) as collateral. It is instructive to see how this
specification affects technology policy.
There is already a large literature concerning technology policy and eco-
nomic growth. First of all, Segerstrom (1991) presented a model character-
ized by the following properties: (i) Duopolists cooperate, so that there are
monopoly prices in all industries. (ii) R&D firms are subject to constant
returns to scale. (iii) R&D firms can both innovate and imitate in each in-
dustry. (iv) Outsiders can innovate a new quality of product at the same cost
as the incumbents. He showed that innovation subsidies speeds up growth,
but promote welfare only if innovative effort is initially large enough.
Later on, Segerstrom’s (1991) model was challenged by the following pa-
pers. Walz (1995) replaced cooperation (i) by Cournot competition and
found out that in some circumstances innovation subsidies may even retard
economic growth. Davidson and Segerstrom (1998) substituted decreasing
returns for constant returns to scale (ii) and showed that innovation subsi-
dies promote growth but imitation subsidies do the opposite. Zeng (2001)
obtained more or less similar results by rejecting (iii) and assuming that in-
novation improves product quality while imitation expands product variety.
Property (iv) in Segerstom’s model leads to leapfrogging: innovations will
always be performed by outsiders and the current industry leaders will be
replaced. Several attempts have been made to eliminate this apparently un-
realistic outcome. Aghion et al. (1997) and Aghion et al. (2001) constructed
models where technological laggards must first catch up with the leading-
edge technology before battling “neck-to-neck” for technological leadership
in the future. They showed that imitation can promote growth by increasing
the proportion of industries in which the more intense “neck-to-neck” compe-
tition takes place. Mukoyama (2003) constructed a model characterized by
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the following properties. Only leaders can conduct next-round innovation.
Outsiders can become leaders by imitation. A newcomer and an incumbent
compete in Bertrand manner, so that monopoly profits disappear after the
entry of an imitator. In Mukoyama’s model, subsidizing imitation may in-
crease the economy-wide growth rate.
All papers referred above assume that R&D firms can borrow any amount
of capital at a given market interest rate. In such a case, firms decide on R&D
and households are protected from uncertainly through diversification in the
market portfolio. Because this assumption is in contradiction with the whole
literature of venture capital,1 we prefer to assume that firms cannot bor-
row without collateral and immaterial property cannot be used as collateral.
Firms must then finance their R&D through issuing shares and households
purchasing these shares face the uncertainly associated with investment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the basic structure of the model. Sections 3 and 4 consider firms in produc-
tion and R&D. Section 5 examines households deciding on saving, section
6 general equilibrium, and section 7 the prospects of public policy. Section
8 analyzes optimal public policy in two cases: the first best, in which the
government can, and in the second best, in which it cannot discriminate be-
tween innovation and imitation. In both cases, optimal elasticity rules for
subsidies and competition policy are presented.
2 The model
In this paper, we extendWa¨lde’s (1999a, 1999b) model of risk-averting house-
holds as follows. (i) The sector of innovating firms is replaced by a large num-
ber of sectors (industries) in which firms both innovate and imitate. (ii) In
R&D, constant returns are replaced by decreasing returns to scale. Following
Mukoyama (2003), we eliminate leapfrogging through the assumption that
only leaders can innovate. The model can then be characterized as follows:
(i) Labour is homogeneous and inelastically supplied. It is used in innova-
tion, imitation or the production of the intermediate goods.
1A nice summary of this literature in given in Gompers and Lerner (1999).
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(ii) Competitive firms produce the consumption good from a great number
of intermediate goods according to Cobb-Douglas tehcnology. Each
intermediate good is produced by a separate industry.
(iii) A R&D firm innovates or imitates. Its success depends on its own in-
vestment and some fixed factor of production (e.g. entrepreneurship).2
(iv) A successful innovator becomes a monopolistic producer of the latest
technology in some industry until the technology is imitated.
(v) Imitation is necessary for an outsider to become a next innovator. A
successful imitator enters the product market and starts competing
with the previous leaders.
(vi) R&D firms finance their expenditure by issuing shares. The households
save only in these shares. Each R&D firm distributes its profit among
those who had financed it in proportion to their investment in the firm.
(vii) The government subsidizes innovation and imitation, and influences
profits in industries with two or more producers by competition policy.
These subsidies are financed by lump-sum taxes on the households.
3 Production
There is a great number of intermediate-good industries which are placed
over limit [0, 1]. The representative consumption-good firm makes its output
y from all intermediate goods through technology
log y =
∫ 1
0
log[Bjxj]dj, xj =
aj∑
κ=1
xjκ, (1)
where Bj is the productivity parameter, aj the number of firms in industry
j, xj the quantity of intermediate-good good j and xjκ the output of firm
2We assume these fixed factors to produce convexity in R&D technology. Cheng and
Tao (1999) found out that the assumption of linear R&D technology leads to the counter-
intuitive result that a government subsidy to imitative (innovative) R&D decreases (in-
creases) imitative but increases (decreases) innovative effort. They showed that by replac-
ing the linear R&D technology by sufficiently convex technology the result is reversed.
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κ in industry j. The firm maximizes its profit Π
.
= Py − ∫
j∈[0,1] pjxjdj by
its inputs xj, taking its output price P and input prices {pj} as fixed. We
normalize total consumption expenditure Py at unity. Because the firm is
subject to constant returns to scale, we then obtain
Py = 1, Π = 0, pjxj = 0 for all j. (2)
Technological change is random. A successful innovator drives the other
producers out of the market and takes over the whole industry. A successful
imitator enters the market and starts competing with the earlier leaders.
Hence, there are industries of two type: (i) one-leader industries, in which
followers imitate, and (ii) industries with several innovating leaders.
Consider first one-leader industry j. Each new generation of good j pro-
vides exactly µ > 1 times as many services as the product of the generation
before it. The leader produces one unit of output from one labour unit and
earns the profit pij
.
= (pj −w)xj1, where w is the wage. Followers can manu-
facture the product one step behind on the quality ladder, produce 1/µ units
of output from one labour unit and earn the profit pifj
.
= (pj/µ − w)xj1. To
keep technological laggards away from the market, pifj = 0, the leader then
sets the price pj equal to µw.
3 From pj = µw and (2) it follows that
xj1 =
1
pj1
=
1
µw
and pij =
(
1− 1
µ
)
pj1xj1 = 1− 1
µ
.
= pi for aj = 1. (3)
Next, consider an industry j with two or more leaders. We assume that
the κth leader anticipates the reaction of the other leaders by the function
pj = Φ(xjκ, aj, ς), φ(aj, ς)
.
= −xjκ
Φ
∂Φ
∂xjκ
∈ (0, pi), (4)
where the variable ς characterizes the government’s competition policy, and
maximizes its anticipated profit pijκ = pjxjκ − wxjκ = [Φ(xjκ, aj, ς) − w]xjκ
by its output xjκ. This, (2) and (4) yield the equilibrium conditions
w = pj + xjκ
∂Φ
∂xjκ
= [1− φ(aj, ς)]pj, xjκ = 1− φ(aj, ς)
ajw
and
pijκ = φ(aj, ς)pjxjκ = φ(aj, ς)/aj for aj > 1. (5)
3Cf. Grossman and Helpman (1991), chapter 4.
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We assume that the more competitors in industry j (i.e. the higher aj), the
lower profits pijκ. This and (5) yield
pijκ
∣∣
aj>2
< pijκ
∣∣
aj=2
. (6)
Anyone investing in firms attempts to maximize its expected profit. The
first leader in an industry is an innovator. If one invests in imitation to enter
an industry with one leader, then its prospective profit is pijκ
∣∣
aj=2
, but if it
invests (with the same cost) in imitatation to enter an industry with more
than two leaders, then its prospective profit is pijκ
∣∣
aj>2
. Hence, given (6),
investors invest in imitation only in one-leader industries. We summarize:
Proposition 1 An industry has one or two leaders. On one-leader indus-
tries the followers imitate, but in two-leader industries the leaders innovate.
We denote the set of one-leader industries by Θ ⊂ [0, 1], the relative
proportion of one-leader industries (two-leader industries), α (β) by
α =
∫
j∈Θ
dj, β
.
=
∫
j /∈Θ
dj = 1− α. (7)
Noting this, (3) and (5), we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 The expected profit is pi for the monopoly in industry j ∈ Θ,
and θ = φ(2, ς)/2 ∈ (0, pi/2) for both firms in industry j /∈ Θ. The output
is xj1 = xα
.
= 1/(µw) for one-leader industry j ∈ Θ, and 2xjκ = xβ .=
[1− φ(2, ς)]/w = (1− 2θ)/w for two-leader industry j /∈ Θ.
Employment is higher in two-leader than one-leader industries, xβ > xα.
There is collusion for θ = pi/2 and Bertrand competition for θ = 0. The less
competition, the higher θ. Hence, θ can be used as a measure for the inten-
sity of product market competition (PMC).4 The government determines θ
through its competition policy ς.
4Kanniainen and Stenbacka (2000) define the relative difference of the imitator’s to the
innovator’s profit as a measure of patent width.
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Summing up throughout firms and industries and noting propositions 1
and 2, (1), (3) and (7), we obtain employment in production, x, as follows:
x
.
=
∫ 1
0
aj∑
κ=1
xjκdj = αxα + (1− α)xβ = ϕ
w
, ϕ(α, θ)
.
= (2θ − pi)α+ 1− 2θ,
∂ϕ
∂θ
< 0, xα =
x
µϕ
, xβ = (1− 2θ)x
ϕ
, y = Bxααx
1−α
β = χ(α, θ)xB,
∂
∂θ
(xα
x
)
> 0,
∂
∂θ
(xβ
x
)
< 0, χ(α, θ)
.
=
(1− 2θ)1−α
µαϕ(α, θ)
, argmax
θ
χ =
pi
2
,
∂χ
∂θ
> 0 ⇔ θ < pi
2
, log B =
∫ 1
0
log Bjdj, (8)
where ϕ is wage expenditure, B the average level of productivity, x employ-
ment, xB efficient labour input and χ the productivity of efficient labour in
production. More intense PMC (i.e. a smaller θ) increases employment x
and total wages wx = ϕ in production, ∂ϕ/∂θ = 2(α − 1) < 0. Because in-
novating two-leader industries j /∈ Θ employ more than imitating one-leader
industries j ∈ Θ, less frequent imitation (i.e. a smaller α) increases employ-
ment x and total wages ϕ in production, ∂ϕ/∂α = 2θ − pi < 0. The rest of
the results can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 3 The productivity of efficient labour in the production of the
consumption good, χ, is maximized with collusion θ = pi/2. The increase in
PMC (i.e. a smaller θ) causes inefficiency, ∂χ/∂θ < 0.
Proposition 3 can be explained as follows. The problem is the maximiza-
tion of total output y = Bxααx
1−α
β subject to the allocation of labour between
innovation and imitation, x = αxα + (1 − α)xβ, where total employment in
production, x, is kept constant. Output y is at the maximum, if all indus-
tries employ the same amount of labour, xα = xβ, and this is possible only
if two-leader industries collude and behave as if they were monopolies. An
increase in PMC (i.e. a decrease in θ) transfers labour from one-leader into
two-leader industries (i.e. xα falls and xβ rises). The greater the difference
xβ − xα, the lower total output y for given x.
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4 Research
According to proposition 1, there are R&D firms of three type: a follower,
which we call firm 0, and the first (second) leader, which we call firm 1 (2).
R&D firm κ ∈ {0, 1, 2} in industry j employs ljκ labour units. Its technology
is a random variable but the probability of its success in one unit of time is a
function of both its input ljκ and some fixed factor (e.g. entrepreneurship).
In two-leader industry j /∈ Θ firms 1 and 2 innovate, no firm imitates,
and the technological change of firm κ ∈ {1, 2} is characterized by a Poisson
process qjκ in which the arrival rate of innovations is given by
Λjκ = λl
ξ
jκ for j /∈ Θ and κ ∈ {1, 2}, (9)
where ξ ∈ (0, 1) and λ > 0 are constants. During a short time interval dν,
there is an innovation dqjκ = 1 in firm κ with probability Λjκdν, and no
innovation dqjκ = 0 with probability 1− Λjκdν.
In one-leader industry j ∈ Θ firm 0 imitates, no firm innovates, and
technological change is characterized by a Poisson process Qj in which the
arrival rate of imitations is given by
Γj = γl
ξ
j0 for j ∈ Θ, (10)
where γ > 0 is a constant. During a short time interval dν, there is an
imitation dQj = 1 with probability Γjdν, and no imitation dQj = 0 with
probability 1 − Γjdν. We assume that it is so much easier to imitate than
innovate that with the same input ljκ the productivity of imitation relative
to innovation, γ/λ, is greater than 2µσ:
γ > 2λµσ. (11)
The invention of a new technology in industry j raises the number of
technology in that industry, tj, by one and the level of productivity, B
tj
j , by
µ > 1. Given this and (8), the average productivity in the economy, B, is a
function of the technologies of all industries, {tk}, as follows:
log B{tk} .=
∫ 1
0
log B
tj
j dj, B
tj+1
/
B
tj
j = µ. (12)
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The arrival rate of innovations in industry j /∈ Θ is the sum of the arrival
rates of both firms in the industry, Λj1 + Λj2. The average growth rate
of Bj due to technological change in industry j in the stationary state is
then E
[
log B
tj+1
j − log Btjj
]
= (Λj1 + Λj2) log µ, where E is the expectation
operator.5 Because only industries j /∈ Θ innovate, then, noting (9), the
average growth rate of B in the stationary state is given by
g
.
=
∫
j /∈Θ
E
[
log B
tj+1
j − log Btjj
]
dj = (log µ)
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj
= (λ log µ)
∫
j /∈Θ
(lξj1 + l
ξ
j2)dj. (13)
This is used as a proxy of the growth rate of the economy.
Total employment in R&D is given by
l
.
=
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj +
∫
j∈Θ
ljdj. (14)
There exists a fixed number N of households, each supplying one labour unit.
Total labour supply N is equal to inputs in production, x, and R&D, l:
N = x+ l. (15)
The government subsidizes R&D expenditures, but possibly at different
rates in innovating and imitating industries. Given proposition 2, we obtain
total expenditures from these subsidies as follows:
R
.
= τα
∫
j∈Θ
wlj0dj + τβ
∫
j /∈Θ
(wlj1 + wlj2)dj, (16)
where wlj0 is expenditure on imitation in firm 0 industry j ∈ Θ, wljκ expen-
diture on innovation in firm κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j /∈ Θ and τα ∈ (−∞, 1)(
τβ ∈ (−∞, 1)
)
is the subsidy to imitation (innovation). If the government
cannot discriminate between innovation and imitation, then τα = τβ.
In industry j ∈ Θ firm 0 and in industry j /∈ Θ firms 1 and 2 issue shares
to finance their labour expenditure in R&D, net of government subsidies.
5For this, see Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 59.
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Because the households invest in these shares, we obtain
N∑
ι=1
Sιj0 = (1− τα)wlj0 for j ∈ Θ,
N∑
ι=1
Sιjκ = (1− τβ)wljκ for κ ∈ {1, 2} and j /∈ Θ, (17)
where wlj0 is the imitation expenditure of firm 0 in industry j ∈ Θ and τα the
subsidy to it, wljκ the innovation expenditure of firm κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry
j /∈ Θ and τβ subsidy to it, and Sιjκ the household ι’s investment in firm
κ ∈ {0, 1, 2} in industry j. Household ι’s relative investment shares in the
firms can be defined as follows:
iιj0
.
=
Sιj0
(1− τα)wlj for j ∈ Θ; iιjκ
.
=
Sιjκ
(1− τβ)wljκ for j /∈ Θ. (18)
We denote household ι’s income by Aι. Total income throughout all
households ι ∈ {1, ..., N} is then equal to income earned in the production of
consumption goods, Py, plus income earned in R&D, wl, minus tax revenue
R. Since total consumption expenditure Py is normalized at unity, this yields
N∑
ι=1
Aι = Py + wl −R = 1 + wl −R. (19)
5 Households
The utility for a risk-averting household ι ∈ {1, ..., N} from an infinite stream
of consumption beginning at time T is given by
U(Cι, T ) = E
∫ ∞
T
Cσι e
−ρ(ν−T )dν with 0 < σ < 1 and ρ > 0, (20)
where ν is time, E the expectation operator, Cι the index of consumption, ρ
the rate of time preference and 1/(1−σ) is the constant relative risk aversion.
Because investment in these shares is the only form of saving in the model,
the budget constraint of household ι is given by
Aι = PCι +
∫
j∈Θ
Sιj0dj +
∫
j /∈Θ
(Sιj1 + Sιj2)dj, (21)
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where Aι is the household’s total income, Cι its consumption, P the consump-
tion price, Sιjκ the household’s investment in firm κ in industry j. When
household ι has financed a successful R&D firm, it acquires the right to the
firm’s profit in proportion to its relative investment share. Hence, we define:
sιjκ household ι’s true profit from firm κ in industry j when the uncertainty
in R&D is taken into account;
iιjκ household ι’s investment share in firm κ in industry j [Cf. (18)];
piiιjκ household ι’s expected profit from firm κ in industry j /∈ Θ after an
innovation;
θiιj0 household ι’s expected profit from industry j ∈ Θ after an imitation.
The changes in the profits of firms in industry j are functions of the
increments (dqj1, dqj2, dQj) of Poisson processes (qj1, qj2, Qj) as follows:
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dsιjκ = (piiιjκ − sιjκ)dqjκ − sιjκdqj(ζ 6=κ) when j /∈ Θ;
dsιj0 = (θiιj0 − sιj0)dQj when j ∈ Θ. (22)
These functions can be explained as follows. Consider first industry j /∈ Θ
in which there are two innovating leaders κ ∈ {1, 2}. If a household invests
in firm κ, then, in the advent of a success for the firm, dqjκ = 1, the amount
of its share holdings rises up to piiιjκ, dsιjκ = piiιjκ − sιjκ, but in the advent
of success for the other firm ζ 6= κ in the industry, its share holdings in the
firm fall down to zero, dsιjκ = −sιjκ. Next, consider industry j ∈ Θ in which
firm 0 imitates. If a household invests in that firm, then, in the advent of a
success for the firm, dQj = 1, the amount of its share holdings rises up to
θiιj0, dsιj0 = θiιj0 − sιj0.
The total income of household ι, Aι, consists of its wage income w (the
household supplies one labour unit) and its profits sιj1 and sιj2 from the
leaders 1 and 2 in each industry j, minus its share 1/N in the government’s
expenditures R. Given this and proposition 2, we obtain
Aι = w +
∫
j∈Θ
sιj1dj +
∫
j /∈Θ
(sιj1 + sιj2)dj − R
N
. (23)
6This extends the idea of Wa¨lde (1999a, 1999b).
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We denote:
Ω
({sιkυ}, {tk}) the value of receiving profits sιkυ from all firms υ in all in-
dustries k using current technology tk.
Ω
(
piiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
the value of receiving the profit piiιjκ from
firm κ in industry j /∈ Θ using technology tj+1, but receiving no profits
from the other firm which was a leader in that industry when technol-
ogy tj was used, and receiving profits sι(k 6=j)υ from all firms υ in other
industries k 6= j with current technology tk.
Ω
(
θiιj1, θiιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {tk}
)
the value of receiving profits θiιjκ from firms
κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j ∈ Θ, but receiving profits sι(k 6=j)υ from all
firms υ in the other industries k 6= j with current technology tk.
Household ι maximizes its utility (20) by its investment {Sιjκ} subject to the
stochastic processes (22), its budget constraint (21), the composition of its
income, (23), and the determination of its relative investment shares, (18),
given the arrival rates {Λjκ,Γj}, the wage w, the consumption price P , the
subsidies (τα, τβ) and the government’s expenditures R. This maximization
leads to the Bellman equation7
ρΩ
({sιkυ}, {tk}) = max
Sιj ≥ 0 for all j
Ξι, (24)
where
Ξι
.
= Cσι +
∫
j∈Θ
Γj
[
Ω
(
θiιj1, θiιj1, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {tk}
)− Ω({sιkυ}, {tk})]dj
+
∫
j /∈Θ
∑
κ=1,2
Λjκ
[
Ω
(
piiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)− Ω({sιkυ}, {tk})]dj.
(25)
Because ∂Cι/∂Sιjκ = −1/P by (21), the first-order conditions are given by
Λjκ
d
dSιjκ
[
Ω
(
piiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)− Ω({sιkυ}, {tk})] = σ
P
Cσ−1ι
for j /∈ Θ and κ ∈ {1, 2}, (26)
Γj
d
dSιj0
[
Ω
(
θiιj1, θiιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {tk}
)− Ω({sιkυ}, {tk})] = σ
P
Cσ−1ι
for j ∈ Θ. (27)
7Cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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6 General equilibrium
The study focuses entirely on the households’ stationary equilibrium in which
the allocation of resources is invariable across technologies, and ignores the
behaviour of the system during the transitional period before the equilibrium
is reached. We try the solution that for each household ι the propensity to
consume, hι, and the subjective interest rate rι are independent of income
Aι, i.e. PCι = hιAι and Ω = C
σ
ι /rι. Inserting these tentative solutions
into (24)-(27), and noting the equilibrium conditions of the labour market
(8)-(15), we obtain hj = h and the following results (see Appendix A):
ljκ = `β for j /∈ Θ,
lj0 = `α for j ∈ Θ,
`α
`β
=
[
(1− τβ)θγ
(1− τα)piλµσ
]1/(1−ξ)
.
= ψ, (28)
Λj1 + Λj2 =
g
(1− α) log µ, l = δ(α, ψ)g
1/ξ,
∂δ
∂α
> 0,
∂δ
∂ψ
> 0, (29)
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g =
µσhz
1− τβ , (30)
g(α, θ, τα, τβ),
∂g
∂τα
< 0 ⇔ ∂g
∂τβ
> 0 ⇔ ∂g
∂θ
> 0
for τα ≈ 0, τβ ≈ 0 and wl < 1 + (ψ/2− 1)α, (31)
where z
.
= (pi/w)λ`ξ−1β is the rate of return to investment in innovative R&D.
Result (28) says that with a higher imitation subsidy τα, a lower inno-
vation subsidy τβ or a higher profit θ in two-leader industries j /∈ Θ, R&D
firms spend relatively more in imitation (i.e. a higher `α/`β). With a uniform
R&D subsidy τα = τβ = τ , the relative investment in imitation is indepen-
dent of taxation. Result (29) says that the more there is imitation (i.e. the
bigger α) or the more an imitating firm invests relative to an innovating firm
(i.e. the bigger `α/`β
.
= ψ), the larger R&D input l is needed to produce a
given growth rate g. The effect of taxation on the average growth rate g is
unfortunately ambiguous [Cf. (31)]. First, a higher growth rate g increases
both the demand for labour in R&D, l, and the wage w, which decreases the
right-hand side of the equation (30). Second, a higher growth rate decreases
a household’s discount factor ρ + 1−µ
σ
log µ
g and the left-hand side of (30). We
assume that the first effect dominates over the second and conclude:
Proposition 4 If the proportion of imitating industries, α, is kept constant,
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then, on rather general conditions,8 a small innovation subsidy τβ promotes
growth, ∂g/∂τβ > 0, but a small imitation subsidy τα and an increase in
PMC (i.e. a lower θ) slow down growth.
The imitation subsidy encourages R&D firms to transfer their resources from
innovation to imitation, which hampers growth. PMC increases employment
in production, the wage and the cost of R&D, which deters growth. Imita-
tion increases the proportion of industries with “neck-to-neck” competition.
In Aghion et al. (1997) and Aghion et al. (2001), firms innovate to escape
“neck-to-neck” competition and consequently imitation increases growth. In
our model, investment is financed by the issue of shares. Because house-
hold even out risk by diversifying their portfolios, they hold shares in both
firms competing “neck-to-neck”. Hence, only the sum of R&D investment in
these two firms taken together is relevant for becoming the owner of the new
technology and households have no reason to support one firm against the
other. Because PMC decreases the profits of both of the competing firms, it
decreases incentives to invest in these.
To close the system, we must now specify how the proportion of imitating
industries, α, is determined. When innovation occurs in an industry, this
industry switches from the group of two-leader industries to that of one-
leader industries, and when imitation occurs in an industry, this industry
switches from one-leader industries to two-leader industries. In a steady-
state equilibrium, every time a new superior-quality product is discovered in
some industry, imitation must occur in some other industry.9 Hence, the rate
at which industries leave the group of two-leader industries, β(Λj1+Λj2)dν, is
equal to the rate at which industries leave the group of one-leader industries,
αΓjdν. From this, (7) and (28) it follows that
2βλ`ξβ = αγ`
ξ
α = αγψ
ξ`ξβ, α/(1− α) = α/β = 2λψ−ξ/γ
and
ψ = Ψ(α)
.
=
(2λ
γ
)1/ξ( 1
α
− 1
)1/ξ
with Ψ′ < 0. (32)
8Because α ∈ [0, 1], the ratio of R&D expenditure to total consumption expenditure,
wl = wl/(Py), is a small number and the imitating firms cannot invest very much more
than innovating firms (i.e. ψ = `α/`β cannot be very much greater than one), the condition
wl < 1 + (ψ/2− 1)α in (31) holds very likely.
9Cf. Segerstrom (1991), p. 817.
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This result says that the more an imitating firm invests relative to an inno-
vating firm (i.e. the larger `α/`β
.
= ψ), the shorter time industries spend in
the imitating stage and the smaller the proportion α of imitating industries.
7 The government
The symmetry across the households ι = 1, ..., n yields Cι = y/N . Noting
Cι = y/N , (8), (15), (29) and (32), a single household’s consumption relative
to the level of productivity, c, can be written as follows:
c(g, α, θ)
.
=
Cι
B{tk}
=
y
NB{tk}
=
x
N
χ = χ(α, θ)
[
1− 1
N
δ(α,Ψ(α))g1/ξ
]
,
∂c
∂g
= − χ
N
l
ξg
= − cl
ξxg
< 0. (33)
Given this, a single household’s utility function (20) takes the form
U(Cι, T ) = E
∫ ∞
T
c(g, α, θ)σ
(
B{tk}
)σ
e−ρ(ν−T )dν. (34)
The government controls the level of profits in two-leader industries, θ,
by competition policy and the growth rate g and the proportion of imitating
industries, α, by subsidies (τα, τβ). Hence, we can define θ, g and α as the
government’s instruments in welfare maximization. We consider two cases:
(a) First-best policy. Where the government can discriminate between in-
novation and imitation, τα 6= τβ, it controls (g, α) by subsidies (τα, τβ)
and maximizes social welfare (34) by the growth rate g, the proportion
of imitating industries, α, and the profit in two-leader industries, θ.
(b) Second-best policy. Where the government cannot discriminate between
innovation and imitation, τα = τβ = τ , it controls (g, α) by the subsidy
τ and competition policy θ, observes the negative relationship of α and
β through (32) and maximizes (34) by g and α.
We denote:
Υ({tk}) the value of each industry k using current technology tk.
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
the value of industry j using technology tj + 1, but other
industries k 6= j using current technology tk.
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Both maximization problems (a) and (b) lead to the same Bellman equation
ρΥ(t) = maxF , where
F .= c(g, α, θ)σ(B{tk})σ + ∫
j /∈Θ
Λj
[
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)−Υ({tk})]dj
= c(g, α, θ)σ
(
B{tk}
)σ
+
g
(1− α) log µ
∫
j /∈Θ
[
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)−Υ({tk})]dj.
(35)
Noting (8), (33) and (35), we obtain the following result:
Proposition 5 In the first-best case (a), collusion is socially optimal,
θ = argmax
θ
F = argmax
θ
c = argmax
θ
χ =
pi
2
.
In the second-best case (b), there must not be collusion, θ < pi/2, and PMC
(i.e. a smaller θ) decreases consumption, ∂c/∂θ > 0.
Product market competition causes inefficiency and decreases output in the
production of consumption goods [cf. proposition 3].
In the second-best case (b) with τα = τβ, inserting (32) into (28) yields
θ(α)
.
= piλµσψ1−ξ/γ = piλµσΨ(α)1−ξ/γ with θ′ < 0. (36)
This says that the higher the imitator’s profit obtain after a successful imi-
tation, the more there are incentives to imitate, the shorter time industries
spend in the imitating stage and the smaller the proportion α of imitating
industries. Noting the function (36), we define the elasticity of total con-
sumption c with respect to the proportion of imitating industries, α, when
the arrival rate of innovations, g, is kept constant, as follows:10
η(g, α, θ)
.
= −α
c
dc
dα
=
{
−α
c
∂c
∂α
with τα 6= τβ,
−α
c
[
∂c
∂α
+ ∂c
∂θ
dθ
dα
]
with τα = τβ = τ .
(37)
Hence, noting proposition 5, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 6 A shift from the first-best to the second-best optimum can be
expressed by a discrete increase in the elasticity η:
η
(
g, α,
pi
2
)
= −α
c
∂c
∂α
< −α
c
[ ∂c
∂α
+
∂c
∂θ
dθ
dα
]
= η
(
g, α, θ(α)
)
.
In other respects, cases (a) and (b) can be examined in the same framework.
10With this definition, the elasticity η will be positive under optimal public policy.
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8 Optimal policy
The government chooses the average growth rate g and the proportion of
one-leader industries, α ∈ [0, 1], to maximize social welfare (34). Noting
(33), the first-order conditions for g and α are given by
∂F
∂g
= σcσ−1
(
B{tk}
)σ ∂c
∂g
+
1
(1− α) log µ
∫
j /∈Θ
[
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)−Υ({tk})]dj
= 0, (38)
∂F
∂α
= σcσ−1
(
B{tk}
)σ dc
dα
+
g
(1− α)2 log µ
∫
j /∈Θ
[
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)−Υ({tk})]dj
= 0. (39)
We try the solution
Υ
({tk}) .= ϑcσ(B{tk})σ, (40)
where ϑ is independent of the endogenous variables of the system. Noting this
and (12), we obtain the optimal growth rate g∗ and the optimal proportion
of imitating industries, α∗, as follows (see Appendix B):
g∗ =
ρσ log µ
(µσ − 1)(σ + ξx/l) , α
∗ =
η
η + l/x
. (41)
We can rephrase these results as follows:
Proposition 7 A small relative proportion of workers in R&D, l/x, and
a low rate of relative risk aversion (i.e. a small 1/(1 − σ) and a small σ)
predict slow economic growth. A large elasticity of consumption with respect
to the proportion of imitating industries, η, and a small relative proportion
of workers in R&D, l/x, predict a high proportion α of imitating industries.
Finally, given (6) and (41), we obtain the following result:
Proposition 8 A shift from the first-best with τα 6= τβ to the second-best
with τα = τβ increases the proportion α of imitating industries.
Hence, PMC (i.e. the decrease of θ below the level of collusion) is a strategic
substitute for discriminating R&D subsidies. It and the imitation tax both
decrease the expected rate of return for imitation and the proportion α.
Inserting g = g∗ from (41) into (30) yields the following result:
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Proposition 9 The welfare-maximizing subsidy to innovation is given by
τ ∗β = 1−
µσ
ρ
(σ
ξ
l
x
+ 1
)
hz.
The innovation subsidy should be the higher, the lower the propensity to con-
sume h, the average rate of return to innovative investment, z, or the relative
proportion of workers in R&D, l/x, or the more elastic consumption is with
respect to imitation (i.e. the higher η).
Inserting (32) and (41) into (28), and noting proposition 5, we obtain:
Proposition 10 If the government can discriminate between innovation and
imitation, τα 6= τβ, the welfare-maximizing subsidy to imitation is given by
τ ∗α = 1− (1− τβ)µ−σ
( γ
2λ
)1/ξ( l
xη
)1−1/ξ
.
The imitation subsidy should be the higher relative to the innovation subsidy,
the lower the relative proportion of workers in R&D, l/x, or the more elastic
consumption is with respect to imitation (i.e. the higher η).
In the case of second-best policy with τα = τβ, noting (28), (32) and (41),
the optimal level of profits in the two-leader industries j /∈ Θ is given by
θ∗ = 21/ξ−1µσpi
(λ
γ
)1/ξ( l
xη
)1/ξ−1
.
When a R&D firm succeeds in imitation and enter the market as the second
leader, the profit in the industry falls from pi to θ. Therefore, we can define
the relative fall of profit in the advent of imitation as follows:
b
.
=
pi − θ∗
pi
= 1− θ
∗
pi
= 1− 21/ξ−1
(λ
γ
)1/ξ
µσ
( l
xη
)1/ξ−1
.
(42)
The increase in PMC (i.e. a decrease in θ) is welfare enhancing (reducing)
for θ ≥ θ∗ and (pi − θ)/pi ≤ b (θ ≤ θ∗ and (pi − θ)/pi ≥ b). We rephrase our
last result as follows:
Proposition 11 If the government cannot discriminate between innovation
and imitation, τα = τβ, then it should increase (decrease) PMC as long as
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in the advent of imitation profits fall less (more) than 100 · b percentages,
where b is defined by (42). The easier it is to imitate (i.e. the higher γ),
the lower the relative proportion of workers in R&D, l/x, or the more elastic
consumption is with respect to imitation (i.e. the higher η), the higher b and
the more likely PMC increases welfare.
9 Conclusions
This paper examines an economy where growth is generated by creative de-
struction: a firm creating the newest technology by a successful R&D project
crowds out the other firms with older technologies from the market so that
the latter lose their value. A research firms can innovate to produce better
versions of the products or imitate to copy existing innovations. Firms fi-
nance their R&D by issuing shares, and households save only in these shares.
The government subsidizes R&D and promotes or hampers product market
competition (PMC). The main findings of this paper are as follows.
There are at most two leaders in an industry. If a firm attempted to
enter an industry with two leaders already, then its prospective profits would
be lower than in industries with one leader only. In one-leader industries
outsiders imitate and in two-leader industries both leaders innovate. For a
given proportion of imitating industries, a small innovation subsidy promotes
growth, but a small imitation subsidy and an increase in PMC (i.e. a lower θ)
slow down growth. The imitation subsidy encourages R&D firms to transfer
their resources from innovation to imitation, which hampers growth.
PMC increases employment in production, the wage and the cost of R&D,
which discourages growth. Imitation increases the proportion of industries
with “neck-to-neck” competition. In Aghion et al. (1997) and Aghion et
al. (2001), firms innovate to escape “neck-to-neck” competition and conse-
quently imitation increases growth. In this study, R&D is financed by the
issue of shares. Because household even out risk by diversifying portfolios,
they hold shares in both firms in “neck-to-neck” competition. Hence, only
the sum of R&D investment in these firms taken together is relevant for be-
coming the owner of the new technology and households have no reason to
support one firm against the other. Because PMC decreases the profits of
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both firms, it decreases incentives to invest in these.
This paper examines also optimal policy in two cases: the first best, in
which case the government can discriminate between innovation and imita-
tion; and the second best, in which case imitation and innovation expendi-
tures are subject to the same subsidy rate. In the first-best case collusion
is socially optimal. A shift from the first-best to the second-best optimum
involves a discrete increase in the proportion of imitating industries. Because
PMC decreases profits in two-leader industries and thereby discourages imi-
tation, it is a strategic substitute for a tax to imitation.
If the governments are rational, a small relative proportion of workers in
R&D or a low rate of relative risk aversion predicts slow economic growth.
A large elasticity of consumption with respect to the proportion of imitating
industries or a small relative proportion of workers in R&D predict a high
proportion of imitating industries. Innovation should be subsidized the more,
the lower the propensity to consume, the average rate of return to innovative
investment, or the relative proportion of workers in R&D, or the more elastic
consumption is with respect to imitation.
If the government can discriminate between innovation and imitation,
then imitation should be the more subsidized relative to innovation, the lower
the relative proportion of workers in R&D, or the more elastic consumption
with respect to imitation. If such discrimination is impossible, then the
government should increase PMC as long as the resulting fall in profits in
the advent of imitation is small enough. The lower the relative proportion of
workers in R&D or the more elastic consumption is with respect to imitation,
the more likely PMC increases welfare.
Appendix
A. Results (28)-(31)
Let us denote variables depending on technology tk by superscript tk.
Since according to (23) income A
{tk}
ι depends directly on variables {stkιk}, we
denote A
{tk}
ι ({stkιk}). Assuming that hι is invariant across technologies yields
P {tk}C{tk}ι = hιA
{tk}
ι ({stkιk}). (43)
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The share in the next innovator tj+1 is determined by investment under the
present technology tj, s
tj+1
ιjκ = pii
tj
ιjκ for j /∈ Θ. The share in the next imitator
is determined by investment under the same technology tj, s
tj
ιjκ = θi
tj
ιjκ for
j ∈ Θ. The value functions are then given by
Ω
({sιkυ}, {tk}) = Ω(θiιj1, θiιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {tk}) = 1
rι
(
C{tk}ι
)σ
,
Ω
(
piiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
=
1
rι
(
C
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι
)σ
. (44)
Given this, we obtain
∂Ω
({sιkυ}, {tk})
∂S
tj
ιj
= 0. (45)
From (18), (23), (43), (44), s
tj+1
ιjκ = pii
tj
ιjκ for j /∈ Θ, and stjιjκ = θitjιjκ for j ∈ Θ
it follows that
∂s
tj+1
ιjκ
∂i
tj
ιjκ
= pi for j /∈ Θ, ∂s
tj
ιj0
∂i
tj
ιj0
= θ for j ∈ Θ, ∂A
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι
∂s
tj+1
ιjκ
=
∂A
{tk}
ι
∂s
tj
ιjκ
= 1,
∂i
tj
ιj0
∂S
tj
ιj0
=
1
(1− τα)w{tk}l{tk}j0
for j ∈ Θ, ∂i
tj
ιjκ
∂S
tj
ιjκ
=
1
(1− τβ)w{tk}l{tk}jκ
for j /∈ Θ,
∂Ω
(
piiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
∂S
tj
ιjκ
=
σ
rι
(
C
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι
)σ−1 ∂Ctj+1,{tk 6=j}ι
∂A
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι︸ ︷︷ ︸
hι/P
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
∂A
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι
∂s
tj+1
ιjκ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
∂s
tj+1
ιjκ
∂i
tj
ιjκ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=pi
∂i
tj
ιjκ
∂S
tj
ιjκ
=
piσhι
(
C
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι
)σ−1
rιP tj+1,{tk 6=j}
∂i
tj
ιjκ
∂S
tj
ιjκ
=
pihισ
(
C
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι
)σ−1
(1− τβ)rιw{tk}P tj+1,{tk 6=j}l{tk}jκ
for j /∈ Θ,
(46)
∂Ω
(
θiιj1, θiιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {tk}
)
∂S
tj
ιj0
=
σ
rι
(
C{tk}ι
)σ−1 ∂C{tk}ι
∂A
{tk}
ι︸ ︷︷ ︸
=hι/P {tk}
∂A
{tk}
ι
s
tj
ιj0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
s
tj
ιj0
∂itιj0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=θ
∂itιj0
∂Stιj0
=
θσhι
rιP {tk}
(
C{tk}ι
)σ−1 ∂itιj0
∂Stιj0
=
θhισ
(
C
{tk}
ι
)σ−1
(1− τα)rιw{tk}P {tk}l{tk}j0
for j ∈ Θ. (47)
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We focus on a stationary equilibrium where the average growth rate g
and the allocation of labour, (ljκ, x), are invariant across technologies. Given
(2), (8), (12) and (15), this implies
l
{tk}
jκ = ljκ, x
{tk} = x = N − l, w{tk} = w = x/ϕ,
P {tk}
P tj+1,{tk 6=j}
=
C
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι
C
{tk}
ι
=
A
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι
A
{tk}
ι
=
ytj+1,{tk 6=j}
y{tk}
=
Btj+1,{tk 6=j}
B{tk}
= µ.
(48)
Inserting (25), (43), (44), (48) and g
.
=
∫
j /∈Θ ljdj into equation (24) yields
0 =
[
ρ+
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj +
∫
j∈Θ
Γjdj
]
Ω
({sιkυ}, {tk})− (C{tk}ι )σ
−
∫
j /∈Θ
∑
κ=1,2
ΛjκΩ
(
piiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
dj
−
∫
j∈Θ
ΓjΩ
(
θiιj1, θiιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {tk}
)
dj
=
[
ρ+
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj
](C{tk}ι )σ
rι
− (C{tk}ι )σ
−
∫
j /∈Θ
∑
κ=1,2
Λjκ
rι
(
C
{tj+1},{tk 6=j}
ι
)σ
dj
=
[
ρ+
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj
](C{tk}ι )σ
rι
− (C{tk}ι )σ − ∫
j /∈Θ
∑
κ=1,2
Λjκ
µσ
rι
(
C{tk}ι
)σ
dj
=
1
rι
(
C{tk}ι
)σ[
ρ+ (1− µσ)
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj − rι
]
=
1
rι
(
C{tk}ι
)σ[
ρ− rι + 1− µ
σ
log µ
g
]
.
This equation is equivalent to
rι = ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g. (49)
Because there is symmetry throughout all households ι, their propensity
to consume is equal, hι = h. From hι = h, (16), (17), (19), (21), (23) and
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(43) it follows that
wl −R = w
∫
j∈Θ
lj0dj + w
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj −R
= (1− τα)w
∫
j∈Θ
lj0dj + (1− τβ)w
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj
=
N∑
ι=1
[∫
j∈Θ
Sιj0dj +
∫
j /∈Θ
(Sιj1 + Sιj2)dj
]
=
N∑
ι=1
(Aι − PCι)
= (1− h)
N∑
ι=1
Aι = (1− h)(1 + wl −R).
Solving for the propensity to consume, we obtain
hι = h =
1−R
1 + wl
. (50)
Given (8) and (15), we obtain the wage
w =
ϕ
x
=
ϕ(α, θ)
N − l . (51)
Inserting (9), (10), (45), (46) and (47) into (26) and (27), we obtain
pihλσµσ
(
C
{tk}
ι
)σ−1
lξ−1jκ
(1− τβ)
(
ρ+ 1−µ
σ
log µ
g
)
wP {tk}
=
σpihιΛjκ
(
C
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι
)σ−1
(1− τβ)rιwlnjP ttj+1,{tk 6=j}
= Λjκ
d
dSιjκ
Ω
(
piiιj, {sι(k 6=j)}, tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
=
σ
P {tk}
(
C{tk}ι
)σ−1
for j /∈ Θ and κ ∈ {1, 2}, (52)
θhγσ
(
C
{tk}
ι
)σ−1
lξ−1j0
(1− τα)
(
ρ+ 1−µ
σ
log µ
g
)
wP {tk}
=
σθhιΓj
(
C
{tk}
ι
)σ−1
(1− τα)rιwlmjP {tk}
= Γj
d
dSιj0
Ω
({θiιj1, θiιj2, {sιm(k 6=j)}, {tk}) = σ
P {tk}
(
C{tk}ι
)σ−1
for j ∈ Θ.
(53)
Equations (52) and (53) yield
ljκ = `β for j /∈ Θ,
lj0 = `α for j ∈ Θ,
`α
`β
=
[
(1− τβ)θγ
(1− τα)piλµσ
]1/(1−ξ)
.
= ψ(θ, τα, τβ),
∂ψ/∂θ > 0, ∂ψ/∂τα < 0, ∂ψ/∂τβ > 0, [∂ψ/∂τ ]τα=τβ=τ = 0. (54)
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The total cost of innovating firm κ is the wage times labour input in
innovation, wljκ. Because in the advent of innovation that firm obtains the
monopoly profit pi, the expected revenue for innovation is the profit times
the arrival rate of innovations, piΛjκ. Dividing this by total cost wljκ yields
the rate of return to investment in innovating firm κ, piΛjκ/(wljκ). Noting
this, (7), (9) and (54), we obtain the rate of return to innovative R&D as:
z =
piΛjκ
wljκ
=
pi
w
λlξ−1jκ =
pi
w
λ`ξ−1β for all innovative firms κ /∈ Θ. (55)
From (7), (9), (13), (14), (16), (50), (51) and (55), it follows that
l = α`α + 2(1− α)`β = [αψ + 2(1− α)]`β,
R = ταw`α + 2τβw`β = (ταψ + 2τβ)w`β =
ταψ + 2τβ
αψ + 2(1− α)wl,
h =
1
1 + wl
[
1− ταψ + 2τβ
αψ + 2(1− α)wl
]
,
g
.
= (log µ)(1− α)(Λj1 + Λj2) = (2λ log µ)(1− α)`β, (56)
l
g1/ξ
=
l/`β
(2λ log µ)1/ξ(1− α)1/ξ =
αψ/(1− α) + 2
(2λ log µ)(1− α)1/ξ−1
.
= δ(α, ψ),
∂δ/∂α > 0, ∂δ/∂ψ > 0, (57)
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g =
pihλµσlξ−1jκ
(1− τβ)w =
hµσz
1− τβ
=
pi
1− τβ
λµσ
1 + wl
[
1
w
− ταψ + 2τβ
αψ + 2(1− α) l
][
αψ + 2(1− α)]1−ξlξ−1
=
piλµσ
1− τβ
[
αψ + 2(1− α)]1−ξlξ−1
1 + ϕ(α, θ)l/(N − l)
[
N − l
ϕ(α, θ)
− ταψ(θ, τα, τβ) + 2τβ
αψ(θ, τα, τβ) + 2(1− α) l
]
.
= ∇(l, α, θ, τα, τβ) with ∂∇
∂l
< 0,
∂∇
∂τβ
> 0,
∂∇
∂τα
< 0 and
∂∇
∂θ
> 0
for τα ≈ 0, τβ ≈ 0 and wl < 1 + (ψ/2− 1)α. (58)
Equations (54) and (56)-(58) yield (28)-(30). Noting (57), equation (58)
defines g(α, θ, τα, τβ). Differentiating (58) totally and noting (57), we obtain[1− µσ
log µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
− ∂∇
∂l︸︷︷︸
−
δ
]
dg =
∂∇
∂τα︸︷︷︸
−
dτα +
∂∇
∂τβ︸︷︷︸
+
dτβ,
∂g
∂τα
< 0 ⇔ ∂g
∂τβ
> 0 ⇔ ∂g
∂θ
> 0.
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B. Results (41)
Noting (12) and (40), we then obtain
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
= ϑcσ
(
Btj+1,{tk}
)σ
= ϑµσcσ
(
B{tk}
)σ
= µσΥ
({tk}). (59)
Inserting (40) and (59) into the Bellman equation (35), we obtain
0 = cσ
(
B{tk}
)σ
+
g/(1− α)
log µ
∫
j /∈Θ
[
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)−Υ({tk})]dj − ρΥ({tk})
= Υ
({tk})[1/ϑ− ρ+ (µσ − 1)g/(log µ)]
and
1/ϑ = ρ− (µσ − 1)g/(log µ) < ρ. (60)
Given (33), (37)-(40), (59) and (60), we obtain
∂F
∂g
= σcσ−1
(
B{tk}
)σ ∂c
∂g
+
µσ − 1
log µ
Υ
({tk}) = ( σ
ϑc
∂c
∂g
+
µσ − 1
log µ
)
Υ
({tk})
=
(µσ − 1
σ log µ
− l
ϑξxg
)
σΥ
({tk}) = [µσ − 1
σ log µ
−
(
ρ− µ
σ − 1
log µ
g
) l
ξxg
]
σΥ
({tk})
= 0, (61)
∂F
∂α
= σcσ−1
(
B{tk}
)σ dc
dα
+
(µσ − 1)g
(1− α) log µΥ
({tk})
=
( σ
cϑ
dc
dα
+
µσ − 1
log µ
g
1− α
)
Υ
({tk}) = (1
c
dc
dα
+
µσ − 1
σ log µ
ϑg
1− α
)σ
ϑ
Υ
({tk})
=
[
− η
α
+
l
(1− α)x
]σ
ϑ
Υ
({tk}) = 0. (62)
Noting (61), we obtain
g =
ρσ log µ
(µσ − 1)(σ + ξx/l) .
Given (62), consumption must be negatively associated with the proportion
of imitating industries, ∂c/∂α < 0. Noting (37) and (62), we obtain η > 0,
α
1− α = −
x
l
α
c
∂c
∂α
=
x
l
η and α =
η
η + l/x
.
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